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November 10, 1986

Supreme Court
State of Utah
Attn: Geoffrey J* Butler
Clerk of Court
322 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

Patricia Christiansen vs. Holiday
Rent-A-Car dba Flexi-Lease, Inc.et al.
Case No. 19700

Dear Mr. Butler:
Pursuant to Rule 24(J) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, respondent in the above-referred matter hereby
submits citations of supplemental authorities. These
authorities became available after the filing of briefs in this
matter.
The cases of Hitt vs. Cox, 737 F.2d 421 (4th
Cir. 1984) and Freeman vs. Schmidt Real Estate and
Insurance, 755 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1985) both relate to
Point 11(E) at Page 25 of Respondent's Brief herein. The case
of Steil vs. Florida Physicians Insurance Reciprocal, 448
S.2d 589 (Fla. App. 1984) relates to Point III of
Respondent's Brief at Page 31.
Copies of all of these cases are attached hereto for the ,
court's convenience.
Sincerely yours,
RICHARDS, BI
& NELSON

ERT
cc:

Samuel King
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souri Approved Instructions, In the main
appellees argue that the district court correctly refused to add appellants' proposed
failure to recall element because no duty to
recall the rims existed under state or federal law. We agree.
[81 Generally, under. Missouri law, to
establish a case of actionable negligence
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, that the
defendant breached the duty, through act
or omission, and that plaintiff was thereby
proximately injured. See Virginia D. v.
Madesco Investment Corp., 648 f S.W.2d
881,886 (Mo.1983) (en banc); see also Nelson v. Freeman, 537 F.Supp. 602, 607
(W.D.Mo.1982), affd sub notru Nelson By
Wharton v. Missouri Division of Family
Services, 706 F.2d 276 (8th Cir.1983). In
addition, whether a duty existed is to be
determined by the court. Hyde v. City of
Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251, 257 (Mo.App.
1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1226,103 S.Ct
1233, 75 L.Ed.2d 467 (1983).
(91 Appellants provide no statute or
atee law to support their position that appellees were under a legal duty to recall
the
rims,
such a duty may have
existed had the Department of Transportation ordered a recall, see The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1411-20, no such notification
of defect and remedy order had been given
pertaining to these rims. Since no duty to
recall was established, a fundamental prerequisite to establishing negligence was absent See Nelson, supra, 706 F.2d at 277.
Although a party has a general right to
have an instruction presenting its theory of
the case, a plaintiff has no right to submit
to the jury an instruction unsupported by
the evidence adduced at trial. Beard v.
Mitchell, 604 F.2d 485, 497 (7th Cir.1979).
further there is no error in the trial
Court's refusal to incorporate the duty to
recall within the duty to warn under the
fycts of this case. We find no basis for
luch an equation, see 2A Frumer and Friedman, Products Liability § 17A.01 (1984
ed), nor do we perceive any prejudice for
failing to include it. The central issue of

whether the appellees negligently breached
their duty to warn of the hazards of the
rims was presented to the jury and the
question was resolved by the jury against
the appellants. Appellants' position that
the appellees should have voluntarily recalled th$ rims was apparent throughout
the course of the trial and further elaboration in the duty to warn instruction was not
necessary or proper. If the jury did not
find appellees negligent for failing to warn,
they could not logically have found them
negligent for failing to recall.
In summary, we find no basis for reversal predicated upon the trial court's evidentiary rulings and negligence instructions to
the jury, and we affirm the judgment of
the district court entered in accordance
with the verdict of the jury.
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§ KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

Charlie G. FREEMAN, Appellant,
v.
SCHMIDT REAL ESTATE & INSURANCE, INC., Niels R. Schmidt, and
AID Insurance Company, Appellees.
No. 84-1227.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Oct. 9, 1984.
Decided Feb. 20, 1985.
Rehearing Denied March 2$, 1985
Injured party brought action against
insurance agent, agency, and insurance
company for their negligent failure to procure liability insurance for insured. Injured party also alleged agent and insurer
had breached their duty to him by failing to
procure insurance for insured. The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, James D. Hodges, Magistrate, entered summary judgment for $e-

136

755 FEDERAL R E P O R T ^

fendants, and injured party appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Jphn R. Gibson, Circuit
Judge, held that: (1) claim assigned to injured party by insured was not enforceable,
and (2) under Iowa law there is no direct
cause of action by crash victim against
insurer for failure to procure automobile
liability insurance for tort-feasor.
Affirmed.
Heaney, Circuit Judge, filed dissenting
opinion anc( would have granted rehearing.
1. United States Magistrates <3=»5
In diversity cases, magistrates' concluCourt of Appeals as to questions of purely
local law.
2. Assignments ^ 7 1
Under Iowa law, tort-feasors never became legally obligated to make any payments to injured party by virtue of covenant not to execute; thus, injured party
received no enforceable rights from them
when they assigned their rights against
agent, agency and insurance company for
their negligent failure to procure liability
insurance for tort-feasors.
3. Insurance <3=*92.1
Under Iowa law, there is no duty from
insurance agents to potential injured party
such as to give injured party direct cause
of action against insurers for negligence in
failing to procure insurance for tort-feasors.

2d

SERIES

Bafore

HEANEY, Circuit Judge, HENSenior Circuit Judge, and JOHN R.
GIgSON, Circuit Judge.
J,EV>

j#HN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.
Qjiarlie G. Freeman appeals from a summar^ judgment entered against him in his
actj#n against Schmidt Real Estate & Insurance, Inc., Niels R. Schmidt, and AID
Insurance Company for their negligent failure t° procure liability insurance for Russe jl K. Catron. Freeman and Catron were
jnv(7lved in an automobile collision, and in
se^Jement of the resulting litigation, Catron* confessed judgment and assigned his
^a-fcts against the agent, agency and insura n t company to Freeman in exchange for
preeman's promise not to execute on the
ju(j£ment. Freeman then brought this suit
aUeging both the assigned claim that the
agent and insurer had breached their duty
to patron to procure insurance and a direct
cjajrn that those same parties had breached
a n independent duty to him in failing to
Catron's request. The magistrate1
meet
rej#cted the existence of such an independent c a u s e °f action and also concluded
t ^ t Freeman, because of the agreement
no ^ to execute and the "indemnity nature"
0 f insurance generally, gained no enforceable rights through the assignment from
Cation. We affirm.
(jatron in the fall of 1978 had had a
conversation with Niels Schmidt in which
gcjjfnidt allegedly agreed on behalf of his
agency anc* AID Insurance Company to
Cy

Simmons, Perrine, Albright & Ellwood,
James R. Snyder, Gregory M. Lederer, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for appellees Schmidt
Real Estate & Ins., Inc.
Crawford, Sullivan, Read & Roemerman,
James W. Crawford, Thomas B. Read, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for appellee AID Ins. Co.
Max E. Kirk, Ball, Kirk, Holm & Mardini,
P.C., Waterloo, Iowa, for appellant.
1. The Honorable James D. Hodges, United
States Magistrate for the Northern District of
Iowa. The parties consented to the assignment

protecting Catron from losses resulting
frorn the use of his vehicles. On November 16, 1978, a vehicle owned by Catron
a n d operated by Mrs. Catron was involved
j n a collision in which Charlie Freeman was
injured. Freeman brought suit against the
Matrons, invoking federal diversity jurisdiction. AID defended the action under a
previously issued, undisputed $50,000 liability policy, with a reservation of rights denying coverage in excess of that amount.
a magistrate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)
(1982).
i0

* 755 F.2d 135 {198"=.

The case was FL-II... .1 m. ;:n.' lulu, wing Freman, slip op. at 6. I he magistrate
,J - r.ilvd that under Iowa law potential
terms:
.;r* vk'tims of possible automobile ace:
1, The Catrons confessed judgment :
aents do not constitute a discernible class
$350,000.00 and costs,
2. Freeman agreed not to execute as to whom a tortfeasor whose duty is
against the Catrons on any amount created Jjy contract n. ty be ji:;!.le despite
of the judgment'in excess of $50,- the lack of privity,
[1] In diversity cases we ordinarily ac
000.00,
cord
substantial weight to the decisions of
3. [AID paid its $50,000:00 liability limexperienced
district judges on 'questions of
its to Freeman], and
local 'law which have not yet.been treated
4, [T]he Catrons assigned to Freeman
by state courts.' Keltner v. Ford Motor
their cause of action against the
Co., 748 F.2d 1265, 1267 (8th Cir.1984);
Schmidt agency and' any other necesKansas State Bank v. Citizens Bank, 737
sary person or entity for the agenF.2d 1490, 1496 (8th Cir.1984). We have
cy's failure to obtain a $300,000.00
earlier stated that bankruptcy judges' conpolicy that would have covered the
clusions are entitled to some deference as
liability asserted against them by
to questions of purely local law, Grenz
Freeman.
Super Valu v. Fix, 566 F.2d 614, 615 (8th
Freeman v. Schmidt J It ul Est a te & Insur- Cir.1977) (per curiam), and we feel no hesiance, Inc., No. C 82 ' i 8 \\\ »j: • at 3 (N.D.tation in considering similarly that weight
Iowa Feb. 2, 1984),
also should be given to comparable deciThereafter, Freeman brought this action sions of magistrates. The magistrate's oralleging as the Catrons' assignee that der here carefully analyzes the applicable
Schmidt, the agency, and AID (hereafter law, .and our research reveals no relevant
"the insurers") were negligent and breach- precedents not fully examined by him. See
ed an oral contract in failing to obtain the Schuster v. U.S. News'& World Report,
additional liability insurance policy in the Inc., 602 F.2d 850, 854 (8th Cir.1979). We"
amount of $300,000. Freeman further al- cannot conclude that the magistrate's preleged that the insurers' failure constituted diction of Iowa law is erroneous.
a negligent breach of a duty owed directly
to him as the victim of an automobile colliI.
sion who would foreseeably be harmed by
As the magistrate recognized, states difthe Catrons'' lack of coverage.,
fer as to whether an insurer may be liable
I he magistrate granted summary judg- to the injured party when the insured bement for the insurers. While observing fore judgment, is protected by an agreethat no Iowa case (the parties agree Iowa ment not to execute. Cases reaching.the
law controls) was directly on point, he went result urged by Freeman basically follow
one of two rationales.
on to state:
It is equally clear that an insurance conFirst, under the typical liability insurance
tract is basically a contract of indemnity. policy, an insurer must reimburse the inHence, since the Catrons never became sured only as to amounts which the insured
legally obligated to make any payments
she ,11 become legally obligated to pay as
to plaintiff by virtue of the covenant not damages." A covenant not -to execute,
to execute they would have been entitled some courts hold, is merely a contract, and
to nothing under the policy and hence not a release, such that the underlying tort
have suffered no damage. Accordingly, liability remains and a breach of contract
plaintiff received no enforceable rights action lies if the injured party seeks to
from them and the fact that the underly- collect his judgment. Thus, the tortfeasor
ing obligation was not extinguished is is still "legally obligated" to the injured
irrelevant.
party, and the insurer still must make good

7.->•-» K K D r . K A L R K P O f t T J . U . Jd S K U I E S

«.:! ii- • tK.trai'iual promise to r ay. .buic'c - v i.. t a i >nsjra?ice ("<;•. v. Ki v e I a, 408
/^nrw Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. N.E.2d 805, 813 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (insurer
- binder, 122 Ariz. 198, 593 P.2d 948, 953 "abandoned" insured when it refused to
(Ct.App.l(J79); Globe Indemnity Co. v. defend on the ground that the policy had
Blomfidd, 115 Ariz. 5, 562 P.2d 1372, 1375 been revoked for false statements on the
(Ct.App.1977); cf. Critz v. Farmers Insur- application); Griggs v. Bertram, 88 NJ.
ance Group, 230 Cal.App.2d 788, 41 "ai. 347. 443 A.2d 163 (1982) (insurer failed to
Rptr. 401, 410 (1964) (agreemem i«,;!.':n- promptly notify insured that it was denying
tortfeasor harmless as to judgrm •-; : . • \
" , ' v -rage). Even those courts which base
cess of his insurance coverage doeMi L i n '' • - findings of liability on the distinction
close suit against insurer for bad-faith fan
veen a release and a covenant not to
ure to settle). An uninsured party wouh.
•ute acknowledge the policy implicathen be injured by the agent's negligent
•'-•
of an opposite conclusion—settlein failing to procure a policy because he ments such as the one here would no longwould have the outstanding "liability" er serve their intended purpose. E.g.,
against which he sought to insure.2
Paynter, 593 P.2d at 953.
• The policy rationale used by other states
Cases reaching the result urged by the
reaching the result urged by Freeman fo- insurers here give the "legally obligated to
cuses primarily on the right of the insured pay" language the practical construction
to protect himself from bad faith conduct adopted by the magistrate: An insured proof his insurer. For example, the Nebraska tected by a covenant not to execute has no
Supreme Court has held that an insured, compelling obligation to pay any sum to the
and thus the insurer, is "legally obligated injured party; thus, the insurance policy
to pay" within the meaning of the policy imposes no obligation on the insurer.
despite an agreement not to execute when Stubblefield v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
the insured enters into such an agreement Insurance Co., 267 Or'. 397, 517 P.2d 262,
to protect himself from the insurer's denial 264 (1973) (en banc); Bendall v. White, 511
of coverage and refusal to defend under F.Supp. 793, 795 (N.D.Ala, 1981); Huffman
the policy. Metcalf v. Hartford Accident v. Peerless Insurance Co., 17 N.C.App.
& Indemnity Co., 176 Neb. 468, 126 292, 193 S.E.2d 773, 774, cert denied, 283
N.W.2d 471 (1964). The Nebraska court N.C. 257, 195 S.E.2d 689 (1973).3 An indistressed that the insurer had "repudiated vidual who is uninsured due to an agent's
its obligation" to the insured, id., 126 negligence then will have suffered no damN.W.2d at.476, and some element of mis- ages, as he would have had no rights under
conduct by the insurer generally has been the policy anyway. While this interpretapresent in the cases in which courts have tion does prevent use of settlements such
followed Metcalf. E,g., American Family as that entered'into by the parties here, we
2. Liability insurance, which is the most common form of automobile insurance and is apparently what Freeman spught here, is to be
distinguished from indemnity insurance, under
which the insurer has no duty to reimburse
until the insured has actually paid out money,
rather than just when the insured becomes "obligated" to pay. See Steffens v. American Standard Ins. Co., 181 N.W.2d 174, 175, 176 (Iofca
1970).
3.

It is not clear that Kelly v. Williams, 411 So.2d
902, 904 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.), petition for review
denied, 419 So.2d 1198 (Fla.1982), belongs with
this group of cases, as cited by the insurers.
Kelly held that an insurer cannot be liable on a
third-party claim of bad-faith failure to settle
when Its insured is protected by agreement

from an excess judgment, The court, however,
also distinguished the situation where the in*
jui ed party brings suit as the insured's assignee
rather than asserting a direct claim and suggest
ed that the judgment against the insured would
not be "blotted out" because it could affect credit ai id title to real estate. Id{ This latter state*
n lent seems more in keeping with those cases
above that hold that an insured protected by an.
agreement not to execute does still have legal
liabilities and damages giving rise to an obligation on the part of the insurer. Furthermore,
another Florida District Court of Appeal panel
cei tified its opinion in Fidelity dt Casualty Co, v.
Cope, 444 So.2d 1041, 1046 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.
1984), as being in direct conflict with Kelly.
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agree with the magistrate that Iowa public
policy does not require a different result in
this case.
Injured parties in Iowa have available
other means whereby they may, after obtaining a judgment against an insured, gain
the insured's rights against the insurer.
E.g., Steffens v. American Standard Instance Co., 181 N.W.2d 174 (Iowa 1970)
(injured party after obtaining and-executing a judgment against insured could
levy on insured's cause of action against
insurer and purchase it at a sheriffs sale).
The issue, therefore, is whether the additional procedure of prejudgment assignment in return for a promise not to execute
also should be available. Iowa's concerns
with permitting such a procedure are apparent from cases that erect barriers
against possibility of collusive settlement.
For example, in Roach v. Estate of Ravenstein, 326 F.Supp. 830 (S.D.Iowa 1971), the
experienced District Judge Hanson denied
a motion for a consent judgment where the
settlement involved assignment by the administrator of the deceased insured's rights
against the insurer in exchange for the
injured party's agreement to seek satisfaction of the judgment only from the estate's
rights in the insurance policy. The court
held that the agreement was beyond the
authority of the administrator due to the
administrator's failure to investigate the
merits of the claim against the insured or
to seek necessary probate court approval
and that the agreement was unconscionable as forcing the insurer to either forgo a
good-faith denial of coverage or risk being
bound by any settlement the insured might
choose to make. The court expressly
found that the purpose of the settlement
had been to "relieve the Plaintiff from the
burden of proving its claim and establishing the liability of, the Defendant estate
and to prevent a defense by the insurer."
Id. at 834. Plaintiff's counsel had actually
been directing the administrator's activities. Such collusion, however, would be
possible anytime the insured were protected by an agreement not to execute prior to
entry of judgment; the insured thus loses
the incentive to contest his liability or the

extent of the injured party's damages either in negotiations or at trial.
[2] Furthermore, the policy concerns
that cause some states to allow such settlements are less pressing when the claim
against the insurer is to be negligent failure to "procure insurance rather than bad
faith refusal to settle or to defend. Insureds and injured parties alike may need
the'possibility of an assignment and covenant not to execute as" a weapon against
insurer misconduct surrounding claims
made under the policy. Cf Critz v. Farmers Insurance Group, 230 Cal.App.2d 788,
41 Cal.Rptr. 401, 408-09 (1964). When the
insurer's breach of its obligations, however, is merely negligent and is removed in
time and nature from the settlement context, such agreements will have less, deterrent effect on insurer practices, and their
possible usefulness in this regard is outweighed by the concern with collusion. We
cannot find the magistrate was incorrect in
his conclusion that Iowa courts would read
the "legally obligated to pay" policy language to protect insurers when their insureds are protected by prejudgment covenants not to execute.
II.
[3] We also agree with the magistrate
that Iowa courts would not find a duty
running from insurance agents to potential
injured parties such as to give Freeman a
direct cause of action against the insurers
here for negligence in failing to procure
insurance for Catron. The seminal Iowa
case is Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395
(Iowa 1969), in which the state supreme
court for the first time recognized that
professionals might have some duty of care
running to persons other than those who
contracted for their services, The court
held that an accountant making a negligent
misrepresentation could be liable to a person who suffered loss in reliance on the
false statement and who was known to the
accountant as a prospective user. Id. at
401-03. The court found it unnecessary to
determine whether such liability should ex-
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tend to all foreseeable persons, but it did
say the scope of the duty should be influenced by "the end and aim of the transaction." Id. at 403.
Later Iowa Supreme Court opinions have
reaffirmed the concern with potentially unlimited liability, e.g., Brody v. Ruby, 267
N.W.2d 902, 906 (Iowa 1978), and our district judges on previous occasions also have
refused to give Ryan an expansive reading.
See Briggs v. Sterner, 529 F.Supp. 1155,
1176-77 (S.D.Iowa 1981). The duty of professionals runs not to all'reasonably foreseen injured parties but just to those actually foreseen "taking into consideration the
end and aim of the transaction." Beech v.
Kapalis, 302 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Iowa 1981).
The aim of the alleged transaction between Catron and the insurance agent
Schmidt was to protect Catron and to protect him from liability. In states where
insurance agents have been held to have a
duty to poteritial injured parties, insurance
as a matter of public policy generally is
characterized as creating a "fund" to compensate accident victims. E.g., Eschle v.
Eastern Freight Ways, 128 NJ.Super. 299,
319 A.2d 786, 787 (Law Div.1974). We
have been cited to no materials showing
that Iowa has adopted such a view, and
Walker v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 340 N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1983),
in fact, has strong language to the contrary.4 Furthermore, the Iowa Supreme
Court in Long v. McAllister, 319 N.W.2d
256, 262 (Iowa 1982), declined to recognize
a duty of an insurer directly to the injured
party to settle in good faith, stressing that
the interests of an insured and insurer are
aligned against the interests of the injured
party. A more expansive concept as to the
purposes of automobile liability insurance
in Iowa would contradict our recognition in
section I, supra, of this opinion that an

insurer has an obligation to pay money
under a policy only after the insured has
incurred liability. The "ends and aim" of
the insurance transaction contemplate a
duty only to others, for example, possibly
Catron's wife, who would have been protected under the policy as to their liability.
Cf. Waddell v. Davis, 571 S.W.2d 844
(Tenn.Ct.App.1978) (plaintiff had a direct
action as a third-party beneficiary against
the insurance agent for negligent failure to
procure uninsured motorist coverage if, as
passenger in car, she would have been an
"insured" within the meaning of the policy
sought by her driver).
This focus similarly distinguishes the
Massachusetts case of Rae v. Air-Speedf
Inc., 386 Mass. 187, 435 N.E.2d 628 (1982),
heavily relied upon by Freeman. The insurance sought there was workers' compensation insurance, which by its very nature and purpose does not require that an
injured employee establish liability on the
part of the employer before recovering.
The essence of workers' compensation is
protection of workers from injuries and not
protection of employers from liability;
thus, when an employer approaches an insurance agent about workers' compensation, employees are "actually foreseen"
parties within the "end and aim of the
transaction" to whom the agent would owe
a duty under Iowa law. The Massachusetts court, in fact, found the employees to
be third-party beneficiaries of the contract
to obtain workers' compensation insurance,
id., 435 N.E.2d at 633, while the Iowa Supreme Court in contrast has found injured
parties not to be third-party beneficiaries
of automobile liability policies. Long, 319
N.W.2d at 262. The magistrate did not err
in his conclusion that Iowa courts similarly
would not extend the liability of insurers to
the situation here.

4. In Walker, the Iowa Supreme Court declined
to invalidate an exclusionary clause in an insurance contract as against public policy. The
court stressed that the legislature had not enacted a compulsory insurance law and made the
following observations: "Our more recent decisions * * * [find] no legislative intent to require
all motorists to have liability insurance and
therefore no legislative expression of a public
policy to protect all victims of traffic accidents/'

340 N.W.2d at 601; "[The cases* cited] do not,
however, declare a judicial policy requiring
automobile insurers to reimburse all persons
injured by negligent operators of insured vehicles," id. at 602; *'[0]ur statutes and decided
cases disclose no such broad public policy [of
'assuring protection to the innocent victims of
automobile accidents'] as was relied upon by the
Washington Supreme Court." Id. at 603.

KNIPE v. HECKLER
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Since we conclude, as matters of law,
first that the claim assigned to Freeman
was not enforceable because Catron was
not "legally obligated to pay" any judgment and thus had no rights against his
insurers, and second that Iowa would not
recognize a direct action by a crash victim
against an insurer for failure to procure
automobile liability insurance for the tortfeasor, the summary judgment in favor of
the injsurers must be affirmed.
HEANEY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. While I do not
disagree with the majority's conclusion that
decisions of a magistrate should be given
weight, I cannot agree that he correctly
resolved the legal issue in the jase. In my
view, the Iowa state courts would be more
likely to follow the views of those states
that would permit recovery than those that
would not. Of course, in any action, the
insured would have to prove his damages
and the insurer would have a right to assert any defense that it might have had if
the insurance had been purchased as requested. This simple safeguard would prevent any collusive settlement.
There are no policy reasons to deny relief
to the plaintiffs. To the contrary, the negligent insurer should bear the responsibility
rather than the innocent plaintiff.
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Gene KNIPE, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

141

curity income benefits. The Secretary of
Health and Human Services determined
claimant was not disabled under Social Security Act and denied request for benefits.
Claimant sought District Court review.
The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Oklahoma, Frank Howell Seay, Chief Judge, affirmed decision,
and appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals, Holloway, Chief Judge, held that: (1)
finding of no disability w%s not supported
by substantial evidence, and (2) claimant
was per se disabled.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Social Security and Public Welfare
<3=>143.60
Claimant's heart impairments met listing of impairments, and therefore, findings
of Secretary of Health and Human Services
that claimant was not disabled were not
supported by substantial evidence. Social
Security
Administration
Regulations,
§§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525(a), 404.1598, App.
1. §§ 1.00 et seq., 4.04, subd. D, 42 U.S.C.
A. App.
2. Social Security and Public Welfare
<S^140.10
When claimant's disability is equal to
or more severe than impairment in listing
of impairments, he is per se disabled. Social Security Administration Regulations,
§§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525(a), 404.1598, App.
1, §§ 1.00 et seq., 4.04, subd. D, 42 U.S.C.
A. App.
3. Social Security and Public Welfare
<S=>140.20

United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.

To establish chest pain of cardiac origin for disability purposes, pain need not
occur during stress tests nor must it occur
at any threshold of frequency or, duration,
Social Security Administration Regulations,
§ 404.1598, App. 1, §§ 4.00, subd. E, 4.04,
subd. D, 42 U.S.C.A. App.

Feb. 13, 1985.

4. Social Security and Public Welfare

Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary,
Department of Health and Human
Services, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 84-1179.
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Claimant sought social security disability insurance benefits and supplemental se-

Claimant was disabled, where his low
22% ejection fraction measured at cardiac
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Vivian M. HITT, Plaintiff,
v.
Luther COX, individually and as Sheriff
of Fauquier County, Va.; George West,
individually and • as Deputy Sheriff/Chief Jailer of Fauquier County,
Va.; Terrell Don Hutto, individually
ttnd as Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections and Virginia Department of Corrections, Defendants,
and

The BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF
FAUQUIER COUNTY, VA.,
Appellee,.
v.
HARLEYSVILLE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant.
Vivian M. HITT, Plaintiff,
v.
Luther COX, individually and as Sheriff
of Fauquier County, Va.; George West,
individually and as Deputy Sheriff/Chief Jailer of Fauquier County,
Va.; Terrell Don Hutto, individually
and as Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections and Virginia Department of Corrections, Defendants,

States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Albert V. Bryan, Jr., J.,
rendered judgment for county in amount
less than that requested, and appeal and
cross appeal were taken. The Court of
Appeals, Ervin, Circuit Judge, held that:
(1) insurer was not estopped from asserting
validity of retroactive cancellations; (2) retroactive cancellation was voidable under
the doctrine of mutual mistake; (3) failure
to give prompt written notice did not preclude coverage; and (4) insurer was not
liable for additional sum which county was
obligated to pay because it succeeded in
obtaining a judgment against insurer for a
specified amount.
Affirmed.

1. Insurance <S=>435.3S
Coverage for injuries which jail inmate
sustained when mattress on bed in her cell
caught fire, apparently from cigarette
smoking, was not within law enforcement
exclusion endorsement of general liability
policy where endorsement excluded liability
for acts or omissions 6f "others" for whom
county was responsible and county board
was sued for its own omissions, e.g., failure to provide funding for proper jail supervision.

and
The BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF
FAUQUIER COUNTY, VA.,
Appellant,
v.
HARLEYSVILLE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
Nos. 83-1225, 83-1230.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit.
Argued Feb. 7, 1984.
Decided June 21, 1984.
County sought indemnification from
general liability insurer for a settlement of
suit brought by a former inmate severely
burned in county jail fire. The United

2. Insurance <3==388(5)
County's general liability insurer was
not estopped from asserting validity of retroactive cancellation of coverage for county jail, notwithstanding insurers' mistaken
representation that jailh'ouse coverage was
provided under another policy, as there was
no indication that representation was made
with knowledge of true facts and neither
insured nor insurer intended to leave the
jail without coverage.
3. Insurance <s=>246
Retroactive cancellation of jail coverage under county's general liability policy
was voidable under doctrine of mutual mistake where insurer mistakenly informed
county that jail coverage -was provided under another policy, county relied on that
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representation and neither party intended
to leave the jail without coverage.
4. Insurance <£=>388(2)
When an insurer, through its agent,
undertakes to advise an insured on the
scope of the insured's coverage, it is reasonable per se for the insured to rely on
the company's representations and a company which purports to be expert in insurance matters and which purports to represent its client's interest cannot avoid the
responsibilities- it has incurred by arguing
in hindsight that an insured cannot believe
an insurance agent. Va.Code 1950, § 38.1-327.2.
5. Insurance <s=>540
County did not waive coverage under
general liability policy by failing to comply
with express notice provisions where insurer had permitted notice to be given orally
and oral notice was promptly given and it
would have been futile to contact insurer
because insurer was in process of cancelling coverage and insurer's agent had led
county to believe that coverage was provided under policy issued by another insurer.
6. Civil Rights <s=*13.7
"Official policy" for purpose of determining liability under Civil Rights Act of
1871 may be established by the omissions
of supervisory officials.
42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
7. Insurance <®=>514.6(1)
Liability insurer's contention that
$350,000 settlement for burn injuries was
unreasonable was rejected where medical
bills alone exceeded $200,000.
8. Insurance e=»514.6(l)
Insured's conditional settlement with
injured party was unreasonable "Where insured, which had $500,000 liability coverage
would be liable to pay injured party an
additional $150,000 when it succeeded in
obtaining a $350,000 judgment, which
amount was found to be a reasonable set* Honorable John W. Peck, Senior Circuit Judge

tlement, notwithstanding that insured,
seeking to recover full policy limits from
insurer, had agreed to pay the additional
amount even if it only recovered $350,000
from insurer.
David P. Durbin, Washington, D.C. (John
0. Easton, Carr, Jordan, Coyne & Savits,
Washington, D.C, Carl Anthony Maio, Harleysville, Pa., on brief), for appellant/cross-appellee.
James P. Downey, County Atty., Warrenton, Va., for Fauquier County *(J- Sloan
Kuykendall, Kuykendall, Wetsel & Kuykendall, P.C., Winchester, Va., on brief), for
appellee/cross-appellant.
Before ERVIN and CHAPMAN, Circuit
Judges, and PECK *, Senior Circuit Judge.
ERVIN, Circuit Judge:
Fauquier County sought indemnification
from the Harleysville Mutual Insurance
Company for attorney's fees and a $500,000 settlement it incurred as a result of a
suit brought by a former inmate severely
burned in a county jail fire. Harleysville
had refused to defend the County in the
original suit and denied liability in the subsequent action for indemnification. The
district court denied Harleysville's motion
for summary judgment and after trial,
awarded th§ County indemnification for
$350,000 of the settlement as well as attorney's fees, expenses and costs. Harleysville appeals from the denial of its motion
for summary judgment and from the final
judgment. Fauquier County cross appeals
on the issue of damages. We affirm.
I.
In 1975 Harleysville became the general
liability insurance, carrier for the Fauquier
County Board of Supervisors (the Board).
The Board's general liability policy provided "premises-operations" coverage on various county buildings including the county
jail. The policy provided the Board with
$500,000 of coverage for each bodily injury
of the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
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for which the Board may be liable as a
result of an unexpected or unforeseen accident. The Board renewed this policy on
June 16, 1979, and extended coverage until
June 16, 1980.
In late 1979, a Harleysville underwriter
contacted Richard Bowen, whose company,
Carr and Hyde, Inc., had arranged Harleysville's insurance coverage of the Board.
The underwriter asked Bc-wen to check
whelher the Board had double coverage for
the county jail. Bowen discovered that the
Board had police professional liability coverage through a policy issued by the Ideal
Mutual Insurance Company. Bowen then
telephoned the County Finance Director,
Larry D. Czarda, and told him that "he
may have found a way to sa've the county
some money" by eliminating the apparent
duplicate coverage. Soon after this conversation, Bowen sent a copy of the Ideal
policy to Harleysville underwriter Mike
Cash and indicated that he thought the
Ideal policy duplicated the jail coverage
under Harleysville's policy. Agreeing that
the Ideal policy duplicated Harleysville's
coverage of the jail, Curtis Klause, another
underwriter, approved on February 21,
1980 deletion of the county jail from the
Harleysville policy. Klause indicated on
cross-examination that Harleysville did not
intend to leave the Board without insurance coverage of the jail.
Harleysville formalized the deletion by
sending a retroactive endorsement dated
March 17, 1980 to Czarda. The endorsement deleted coverage of the jail from June
16, 1979, to June 16, 1980. The district
court specifically found that Czarda did not
object to the deletion because Bowen had
assured him "that the Ideal policy contained the same coverage for the jail as the
Harleysville policy." (J.A. 21) The district
court also found that the Board had reasonably relied on Bowen to determine whether
there was double coverage.
Two weeks before Klause approved deletion of the county jail from the Harleysville
policy, the incidents giving rise to this case
occurred. In the early morning hours of
February 3,1980, Vivian Hitt was jailed for

drunk driving After she was left unattended with a package of cigarettes and
matches, the mattress on the bed in her cell
caught fire, and she was severely burned.
Hitt incurred medical bills in excess of
$200,000, and in February 1982 brought
suit against the Board, the Sheriff, and the
Deputy Sheriff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
Virginia tort law.
Before filing a claim with Ideal, the county attorney examined the policy and disebvered that the Ideal policy did not cover the
jail. After filing an answer and making
further investigation of the circumstances
surrounding the deletion of jail coverage
from the Harleysville policy, the county
attorney wrote to Harleysville on May 13,
1982, and demanded that Harleysville defend the Board in the Hitt action and pay
any judgment or settlement resulting from
the suit. Although the Harleysville policy
required that written notice of any potential claim be given "as soon as practicable,"
the district court found that it was the
practice of Harleysville not to require written notice, and that within one week of the
fire, Czarda had informed Bowen of the
incident. After receiving the wrritten demand to defend, Harleysville formally denied responsibility for coverage.
In response to Hitt's complaint, the
Board moved for summary judgment and
raised the defenses of good faith and official immunity. The district coqrt denied
the Board's motion but granted Hitt's motion to strike the Board's defenses. Following these rulings, the Board, on July 5,
1982, settled with Hitt. The terms of the
settlement were highly irregular. The
Board agreed to pay Hitt $350,000 in cash
on July 15 and agreed to assign an additional $150,000 to Hitt if it succeeded in an
action for indemnification against Harleysville. The Board agreed to seek recovery
of $500,000 (the limit for personal injury
liability in its insurance policy) from Harleysville. However, the Board also agreed
to pay the additional amount to Hitt even if
it only recovered $350,000 from the insurance company.
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ing Board, no evidence indicated that it
made its representation with knowledge of
the true facts. Indeed, the district court
specifically found that the parties did not
intend to leave the Board without coverage
for the jail.
[3] Nonetheless, we conclude the retroII.
active cancellation is voidable under the
[1,2] Harleysville argues that the ret- doctrine of mutual mistake.3 It is well
roactive cancellation of coverage relieves it established that "a mutual mistake as to
of any liability in this case.1 The district the existence of facts which go to the escourt concluded that Harleysville was es- sence of a contract will render a contract
topped from asserting the validity of the voidable where it later appears that such
retroactive cancellation. We agree with facts did not exist." United States v. GarHarleysville that the doctrine of estoppel land, 122 F.2d 118, 121 (4th Cir.), cert
does not apply. In Virginia2, estoppel re- denied, 314 U.S. 685, 62 S.Ct. 189, 86 L.Ed.
quires that:
548 (1941). Accord Virginia Iron Coal &
(1) There must have been a false repre- Coke Co. v. Graham, 124 Va. 692, 98 S.E.
• sentation or concealment of material 659 (1919). In this case, both parties asfacts; (2) the representation must have sumed that the jail was covered under the
been made with knowledge of the facts; Ideal policy, and the assumed existence of
(3) the party to whom it was made must this fact led to the retroactive cancellation
have been ignorant of the truth of the contract.
matter; (4) it must have been made with
Harleysville contends that a mistake canthe intention that the other party should not be attributed to it because Bowen was
act upon it; and (5) the other party must not its agent. The district court found to
have been induced to act upon it.
the contrary, and its finding is supported
Trqyer v. Bristol Parking Inc., 198 Va. by the evidence. Carr and Hyde, Inc., for
(#5, G04-05, 95 S.E.2d 224, 231 (1956) (quot- which Bowen worked and which he partly
ing Taylor v. Cussen, 90 Va. 40, 43, 17 S.E. owned, solicited insurance for Harleysville.
721 (1893)). Although Harleysville through Under Va.Code § 38.1-327.2, this solicitaBowen made a false representation of fact tion conclusively establishes agency. The
which induced the reliance of an unknow- question of agency aside, Curtis Klause, a
The district court concluded that Harleysville was estopped from denying coverage in this case. It found the $350,000
settlement reasonable, but refused to
award the additional $150,000 because the
Board had only paid $350,000.

t.

Harleysville additionally argues that even if its
policy were in effect, the Law Enforcement Exclusion Endorsement excludes coverage in this
case. This argument is completely without merit. The endorsement provides:
It is agreed that this policy or any endorsement attached hereto shall not apply to any
bodily injury liability, personal injury liability, property damage liability, or penalties,
fines, punitive or exemplary damages because
of any act or omission of the insured's law
enforcement agency or of any other person
for whose acts or omissions the^Insured is
legally responsible; and arising out of the
discharge of duties of a law enforcement officer or official.
(J.A. 250) (emphasis added). This endorsement
excludes liability for acts or omissions of "others" for whom the insured is responsible as long
as those acts or omissions arise out of the discharge of law enforcement duties. The Board,
however, Was sued for its own omissions (e.g.

failure to provide funding for proper jail supervision). Thus, the exclusion clearly docs not
apply.
2. The parties appeared before the district court
on diversity jurisdiction, and the acts giving rise
to this suit occurred in Virginia; therefore, we
apply Virginia law. See Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S, 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 LEd.
1188(1938).
3. Because we hold that the retroactive cancellation was voidable,'we do not address the question of whether a retroactive cancellation may
ever relieve an insurance company from liability which it has already incurred. We note,
however, that there is considerable question
whether such a cancellation may be effective.
See Bassett v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 565
S.W.2d 823 (Mo.App.1978)., Ms. Hitt was injured on February 3, 1980, and the retroactive
cancellation was dated March 17, 1980.
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Harleysville underwriter and the man who
approved the deletion of jail coverage, established mistake of fact on Harleysville's
part Klause testified that in deleting the
Harleysville policy, the company did not
intend to take away from the Board's total
coverage.
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[5] We agree with the district court
that two independent grounds excuse the
Board's failure to give prompt written notice of the Hitt accident. First, the district
court found on the basis of sufficient evidence that Harleysville frequently permitted notic? to be given orally. In this case
[4] As an alternative defense, Harleys- oral notice was promptly given to Bowen
ville notes that a party seeking relief under over the phone. By customarily relying on
the mutual mistake doctrine must have ex- oral notice, Harleysville waived the written
ercised reasonable diligence, Solenberger notice provision. See Wbodmen of World
v. Strickler, 110 Va. 273, 65 S.E. 566 Life Insurance Soc. v. Grant, 185 Va. 288,
(1909), and argues that the Board's reliance 38 S.E.2d 450 (1946) (holder of contractual
on Bowen was unreasonable. The district rights may waive them by conduct). Seccourt, however, concluded that it was rea- ond, it would have been futile for the
sonable for the Board to "place themselves Board to contact Harleysville because the
in the hands of the man who handled their company was in the process of cancelling
insurance for Harleysville [and] who was coverage. Although Harleysville did not
knowledgeable in that area where they officially cancel coverage until March 17,
were not." (J.A. 240) We believe this 1980, Bowen led the Board to believe that it
ruling was correct When an insurance was covered under the Ideal policy. The
company, through its agent, undertakes to Board was therefore justified in assuming
advise an insured on the scope of the in- that it would be unnecessary to contact
sured's coverage, it is reasonable per se for Harleysville about the fire. See Andrews
the insured to rely on the company's repre- v. Cahoon, 196 Va. 790, 86 S.E.2d 173
sentations. A company which purports to (1955) (failure to forward summons to inbe expert in insurance matters and which surer within reasonable time as required by
purports to represent its client's interest policy excused where insurer has denied
• cannot avoid the responsibilities it has thus liability).
incurred by arguing in hindsight that an
insured cannot believe an insurance agent.
IV.
Cf. Farmers* & Mechanics' Benevolent
[6,7] Harleysville also challenges th^
Fire Insurance Ass'n v. Williams, 95 Va. $350,000 settlement as unreasonable. See
248, 28 S.E. 214 (1897) (insured entitled to Employers Mutual Liability Insurance
rely on representation of agent that fire Co. of Wiscoyisin v. Hendrix, 199 F.2d 53,
olicy covered insured premises if a night 60 (4th Cir.1952) ("in every case of settle•vatchman was employed near the premis- ment before judgment the reasonableness
es).
of the compromise is a proper subject of
inquiry" in a subsequent action by the inIII.
sured against the insurer). It argues that
Harleysville also contends that even if the Board could not possibly have been
the retroactive cancellation were not effec- found liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We'
tive, the Board waived coverage by failing do not share Harleysville's conviction. Ofto comply with the express notice provi- ficial policy for purposes of determining
sions of the general liability policy. The § 1983 liability may be established by the
Harleysville insurance policy required that omissions of supervisory officials. Avery
written notice of any "occurrence" be "giv- v. County of Burke, 660 F.2d 111, 114 (4 th
en as soon as practicable." Hitt was in- Cir.1981). The County was responsible for
jured February 3,1980. The Board did not providing the jail. Va.Code § 15.1-257%
give its first written notice until May 13, The County had been informed about the
inadequacies of matron service (inspection
1982.

7,1 J H"J)t'JCAh ici'Ii o k I l-.lc

of female cells) and had been asked for
supplemental funding to extend that service. It had also been notified of the risk
of fire in jail cells in connection with requests for audio monitoring and smoke detectors. It apparently turned down these
specidl funding requests. Most significantly1 from the Board's perspective, the district
court had denied the motion for summary
judgment and struck the Board's defenses
of good faith and official immunity. Given
these adverse legal rulings and considering
the severe injuries sustained by Ms. Hitt
(she was permanently disfigured), it was
reasonable for Harleysville to offer Hitt a
$350,000 settlement, especially in view of
the fact that her medical bills alone exceeded $200,000.
V.
The Board cross appeals from the district
court's denial of its claim for indemnification of the conditional portion of the settlement. The Board became liable to pay Hitt
an additional $150,000 when it succeeded in
obtaining a $350,000 judgment against Harleysville. Harleysville points out that
many courts have refused to award indemnification for conditional settlements because the settlement was not a sum that
the insured was legally obligated to pay.
For example, in Huffman v. Peerless Insurance Co., 17 N.C.App. 292, 193 S.E.2d
773, cert denied, 283 N.C. 257, 195 S.E.2d
689 (1973), the insured entered into a consent judgment on the condition that the
judgment be collected from his insurance
company -without recourse to his personal
assets. As in the Harleysville insurance
policy, Peerless agreed to indemnify the
insured only for amounts that the insured
was legally obligated to pay. The North
Carolina Court of Appeals concluded that
because the insured was not legally obligated to pay damages to the plaintiff? Peerless was not liable under its insurance policy. See also American Casualty Co. v.
Griffith, 107 Ga.App. 224, 129 S.E.2d 549
4. But see Cob Ien tz v. American Surety Company
off New York, 416 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir.1969) (insurance company which unjustifiably refused to
defend action against insured cannot challenge
settlement unless it is tainted by fraud or collu-
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(1963); Stubblefield v. St Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 267 Or. 397, 517 P.2d 262
(1973).4 In all the eases cited by Harleysville, however, the insured was not legally
responsible for paying the conditional settlement. In contrast, the Board has become personally obligated to pay the $150,000. This fact distinguishes the cases cited
by Harleysville from this case.
[8] We, nevertheless, conclude that
Harleysville is not liable to indemnify for
the conditional settlement because we find
the settlement patently unreasonable.
When the Board settled with Hitt, it held a
$500,000 personal injury liability policy
with Harleysville that it reasonably suspected might be still in effect. Once it
agreed to settle by paying Hitt $350,000, it,
had no incentive to avoid an agreement to
pay an additional $150,000 if Harleysville
was found liable to indemnify. In this situation, the negotiating parties no longer
have adverse interests, and their conditional settlement is presumptively unreasonable. The fact that the Board agreed to
pay the additional $150,000 even if Harleysville was only found liable for the original
$350,000 does not establish arm's length
bargaining. Rather, it reveals an attempt
to do indirectly what the line of cases cited
by Harleysville would prevent doing directly—that is, recover amounts that the insured does not expect to pay out of its own
resources. To allow the Board full recovery in this case would set a precedent allowing any insured left to defend himself
• not only ty settle at a reasonable amount,
but to give away an additional amount up
to the liability limit of the policy conditional
on a successful indemnity suit against the
insurance company, We decline to reach
such an, unfair resi ilt.
[ }

For the foregoing reasons, the district
court's decision is affirmed in all respects.
AFFIRMED.
sion). Cob ten tz, however, is not controlling in
Virginia and appears to be contrary to the law
of this circuit. Cf. Employers Mutual Liability
Ins. Co. of Wisconsin v, Hendrix, 199 F.2d 53, 60
(4th Cir.1952).
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PER CURIAM.
This case was tried to a jury on the
issues of negligence and contributory (comparative) negligence. The trial court directed a verdict as to the plaintiffs lack of
contributory negligence. We hold that
there was no error in the trial judge's
denial of a motion for mistrial made on the
ground that plaintiffs counsel, in closing
argument, informed the jury that they
would not hear further about the issue of
the plaintiffs negligence because the trial
court had ruled as a matter of law that the
plaintiff was not negligent.
AFFIRMED.
ORFINGER, C.J., and DAUKSCH
COWART, JJ , concui

ill
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Colleen STEIL, \ppellant,
FLORIDA PHYSICIANS' INSURANCE
RECIPROCAL, and A. Ronald
Walker, MP Appellees.
Nos 83-1082, 83-1083.
District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Second District
\pnl H 11)84.
In malpractice action, plaintiff sought
recovery of damage from physician's insurer and sought to recover from physician for
asserted breach of settlement agreement
entered into between plaintiff and physician. The Circuit Court for Hillsborough
County, John M. Gilbert, J., granted defendants' motions to dismiss and dismissed
complaint with prejudice, and plaintiff appealed. The District Court of Appeal,
Grimes, Acting C.J., held that: (1) ordinary
standard of collusion or fraud is inappropriate in evaluating insurer's obligation to pay

amount of settlement \\ here insurer refuses to defend and physician stipulates to
settlement figure in order to obtain his
relief from liability, hut (2) explicit wording
of settlement agreement entered into by
plaintiff and physician and assignment to
plaintiff of physician's rights against insurer foreclosed plaintiff from making any
further claim against physician.
Affirmed m part and reversed in part.

1 Insurance <S»514.6(2), 612.11 !>
If insurer's refusal to defend claim
against insured was improper, insurer
would not be able to rely upon "no action"
clause to defeat claim predicated upon insured's settlement, and insurer would not
necessarily be exonerated on ground that
insured was able to obtain his own discharge from liability in course of reaching
agreement with claim ant.
2. Insurance <^612.1(1)
Propriety of insurer's refusal to defend will control right of carrier to rely
upon "no action" clause.
I Insurance <s=»646
As condition precedent to any recovery
against insurer, claimant would have to
prove that her claim against insured was
within coverage of policy.
4. Insurance <s=>514.6(2)
Ordinary standard of collusion or
fraud is inappropriate in evaluating insurer's obligation to pay amount of settlement
where insurer refuses to defend and insured stipulates to settlement figure in order to obtain his relief from liability
ft. Insurance 0=514.6(2)
Settlement entered into between insured and claimant may not be enforced
against insurer who has refused to defend
if such settlement is unreasonable in
amount or tainted by bad faith.
(i Insurance c=>646
Where insurer refuses to defend and
cliimant and insured enter into settlement,
paity seeking to enforce settlement against
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insurer should assume burden of initially
going forward with production of evidence
sufficient to make prima facie showing of
reasonableness and lack of bad faith, even
though ultimate burden of proof will rest
upon insurer
7. Compromise and Settlement ^ ^ ( S )
Wording of settlement agreement entered into between insured and claimant
and assignment to claimant of insured's
rights against insurer foreclosed claimant
from making any further claim against insured
Lee S. Damsker of Maney & UainAci,
Tampa, for appellant.
William C. Blake, Jr. and H. Dennis Rogers of Blake & Associates, Tampa, for appellee Florida Physicians' Ins. Reciprocal.
F. Ronald Fraley and Timon V. Sullivan,
Trial Counsel, and Charles P. Schropp and
Raymond T. Elligett, Jr., Appellate Counsel, of Shackleford, Farrior, Stallings &
Evans, P.A., Tampa, for appellee A. Ronald
Walker, M.D
GRIMES, Acting Chief Judge.
In this complicated malpractice action,
the injured plaintiff settled her claim
against the defendant doctor by acquiring
an "assignment of his rights against his
insurance carrier and then discharging him
from liability. She now asserts her right to
recover the settlement figure from the insurance carrier which had previously denied coverage to the doctor.
Appellant-plaintiff (Steil) sued Dr. A.
Ronald Walker (Walker), a physician specializing in psychiatry, and Florida Physicians' Insurance Reciprocal (carrier). In
her third amended complaint she alleged
that she became Walker's patient and that
he failed to properly diagnose and treat her
condition. During the course of treatment,
Walker pursued "a course of conduct in
which he allowed a counter-transference of
his personal feeling to plaintiff, contrary to
accepted psychiatric standards."
Steil
claimed that such negligent course of con-

duct caused her extensive and permanent
psychiatric injury and humiliation.
The complaint went on to recite that Steil
filed a malpractice claim against Walker.
It was further alleged that Walker's insurance carrier denied that the claim was covered under the policy and wrongfully refused to provide Walker with a defense. Ultimately, Steil and Walker entered into a
written stipulation and agreement for settlement of all claims. Walker acknowledged that he was obligated to Steil for
$35,000 in damages, and he also gave her a
written assignment of all his rights and
causes of action against the carrier as they
related to Steil's claim except claims for
attorney's fees. As part of the settlement,
Steil released Walker from further liability
and dismissed her claim for malpractice
against him. Steil asserted that her claim
against Walker was within the coverage of
the policy and demanded damages from the
carrier of $35,000.
in a second count of the complaint, Steil
sought a declaratory interpretation of the
settlement agreement with Walker. She
also prayed that if the agreement were
interpreted contrary to her view, the court
should declare the agreement to be without
consideration so that she could proceed
against Walker. In count III she alleged
what she described as a breach of Walker's
agreement to pay her $35,000.
The court granted both defendants' motions to dismiss. When it appeared that
Steil did not wish to amend her pleadings
further, the court dismissed the third
amended complaint with prejudice. Steil
then filed separate appeals with respect to
each defendant. She contends before this
court that she has sufficiently stated a
cause of action against both.
Walker's policy contains the customary
"no action" clause which provides that no
action can lie against the carrier until the
insured's obligation to pay has been finally
determined, either by judgment against
him after actual trial or by written agreement entered into by the carrier. The carrier's position is that since neither of these
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events has occurred

il cannot maintain

her suit.
Steil relies upon the general rule that if
an insurer wrongfully refuses to defend,
an insured is entitled to make a reasonable
settlement without requiring the suit to be
carried to judgment even though the policy
purports to avoid liability for a settlement
made without the insurer's consent. Phoenix Assurance Co. v. Hendry Corp., 267
So.2d 92 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972), cert, discharged, 277 So.2d 532 (Fla. 1973); Cun-

ningham v. Austin Ford, Inc., 189 So.2d
661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966), cert, dismissed,
198 So.2d 829 (Fla. 1967). The carrier responds, however, by pointing out that
Walker has neither paid nor become obligated to pay any monies in satisfaction of
Steil's claim. The carrier argues that since
its policy obligations are predicated upon
Walker's liability, it cannot be held responsible when Walker has been discharged
from liability without making any payment.
There is no Florida case in point, although the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Coblentz v. American Surety Co., 416
F.2d 1059 (5th Cir.1969), endeavored to apply Florida law to a rather similar factual
situation. In that case the insured stipulated with the claimant for entry of a $50,000
judgment against him after the insurance
carrier withdrew its defense. Despite the
fact that it was later determined that coverage existed, the trial court directed a
verdict for the insurer because the stipulated judgment provided that it could only be
satisfied from the insured's liability policy.
The court of appeals reversed and ruled
that by virtue of the insurer having elected
to leave the insured to his own defenses, it
could not later complain about the form of
the judgment. Since there was no evidence
that the stipulated judgment was tainted
by fraud or collusion, the court directed the
entry of a judgment against the insurer for
$50,000,
In addition to Coblentz, a slim majority
of other jurisdictions permit an injured
plaintiff to recover from the insurer despite
the existence of a covenant between the
plaintiff and the insured to seek relief only

from the insurer. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Paynter, 122
Ariz. 198, 593 P.2d 948 (Ariz.Ct.App.1979):

Zander v. Casualty Insurance

Co., 259

Cal.App.2d 793, 66 Cal.Rptr. 561 (1968):

American Family Mutual Insurance Co.
v. Kivela, Ind.App., 408 N.E.2d 805 (1980):
Miller v. Shugart, 316 N.W.2d 729 (Minn

1982); Metcalfv. Hartford Accident & In
demnity
Co., 176 Neb. 468, 126 N.W.2d
471 (1964); Griggs v. Bertram, 88 N.J. 347,
443 A.2d 163 (1982); contra Bendall v.
White, 511 F.Supp. 793 (N.D.Ala.1981);

American

Casualty Co. v. Griffith, 107

Ga.App. 224, 129 S.E.2d 549 (1963); Huff-

man v. Peerless Insurance

Co., 17 N.C.

App. 292, 193 S.E.2d 773, cert, denied, 283
N.C. 257, 195 S.E.2d 689 (1973); Stubble-

field v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co., 267 Or. 397, 517 P.2d 262 (1973). In
each of these cases except Griffith, a consent judgment was actually entered against
the insured, along with an agreement that
the plaintiff would seek only to execute
against the insured's liability policy. However, we do not view the failure of formally
obtaining a consent judgment as a meaningful distinction because the courts seldom inquire into the bona fides of a consent judgment, and even the entry of a
consent judgment fails to meet the requirements of the no action clause.
[1] By refusing to defend Steil's claim,
the carrier left Walker to his own devices
to protect himself in the best way possible.
If the refusal was improper, we do not
believe that the carrier can now rely upon
the "no action" clause to defeat a claim
predicated upon the insured's settlement.
Moreover, we hold that the carrier was not
necessarily exonerated because Walker
was able to obtain his own discharge from
liability in the course of reaching an agreement with Steil. Clearly, the intent of Steil
and Walker was not to release the carrier.
Cf. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Cope, 444
So.2d 1041 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), petition for
review granted (Fla. Feb. 6, 1984) (No.
64,825) (holding that an injured party may
release a tort-feasor without discharging
his insurer from a suit for bad faith).
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[2,3] A further question arises with respect to the insurance issues to be tried.
Certainly, the propriety of the carrier's refusal to defend must be decided because
this will control the right of the carrier to
rely upon the "no action" clause. Presumably because the duty to defend is usually
broader than the duty to indemnify, Florida Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.
v. Rice, 393 So.2d 552 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980),
'petition for review denied, 399 So.2d 1142
(Fla.1981), Steil suggests that the sole is™
sue would be whether the carrier breached
its duty to provide a defense for Walker.
However, the only effect of a wrongful
refusal to defend would be to preclude the
carrier from relying upon the "no action"
clause. Up to this point, the question of
coverage has never been decided. Therefore, as a condition precedent to any recovery against the carrier, Steil will have to
prove that her claim against Walker was
within the coverage of the policy. We note
that in every case in which the plaintiff
prevailed under what we have characterized as the majority rule, the issue of coverage was decided in his favor.
The real concern in this type of case is
that the settlement between the claimant
and the insured may not actually represent
an arm's length determination of the worth
of the plaintiffs claim. In a situation
where the insured actually pays for the
settlement of the claim against him or
where the case is fully litigated at trial
before the entry of a judgment, the amount
of the settlement or judgment can be assumed to be realistic. Therefore, if the
insurer is later determined to have wrongfully refused to defend and the claim is
within the coverage, it will be obligated to
pay the amount of the settlement or judgment, at least within its policy limits, in the
absence of a showing of collusion or fraud.
1 R. Long, The I aw of Liability Insurance
§ 5.14 (1983).
[4-6] However, in the instant case or
one involving a consent judgment with a
covenant not to execute, the settlement figure is more suspect. The conduct of an
insu red can ha rd 1 y be ch ara cte rized as

fraudulent simply because he stipulates to
a large settlement figure in order to obtain
his release from liability. He has little or
nothing to lose because he will never be
obligated to pay. As a consequence, the
settlement of liability and damages may
have very little relationship to the strength
of the plaintiffs claim. Due to this problem, the ordinary standard of collusion or
fraud is inappropriate. See Miller v. Shugart. Thus, we hold that in a case such as
this, a settlement may not be enforced
against the carrier if it is unreasonable in
amount or tainted by bad faith. Moreover,
because the circumstances surrounding the
settlement will be better known to the party seeking to enforce it, he should assume
the burden of initially going forward with
the production of evidence sufficient to
make a prima facie showing of reasonableness and lack of bad faith, even though the
ultimate burden of proof will rest upon the
carrier. As stated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Griggs v. Bertram when it
adopted a similar guideline:
This rule reasonably accommodates and
compromises the competing interests of
the parties and considerations of public
policy. It will discourage collusive or
overreaching impositions upon insurance
carriers and, at the same time, will be
conducive toward encouraging settlement and protecting an insured in its
efforts amicably to resolve a claim
against it after having been abandoned
by its carrier.
88 N.J. at 368, 443 A.2d at 174.
[7] The explicit wording of the settlement agreement arid the assignment forecloses Steil from making any further claim
against Walker. Since these documents
have been vindicated by this opinion, Steil's
claims against Walker were properly dismissed.
We affirm the order of dismissal in favor
of Walker in case number 83-1082. We
reverse the order of dismissal against the
carrier in case number 83-1083 and remand
for further proceedings,
CAMPBELL and LEHAN, JJ., concur.

